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Outrageous State, Sectarianized
Citizens:
Deconstructing the ‘Textbook
Controversy’ in the Northern Areas,
Pakistan
Nosheen Ali
Introduction
1 In May 2000, the Shia Muslims1 based in the Gilgit district of the Northern Areas began to
agitate against the recently changed curriculum of government schools in the region. The
controversial textbooks spanned various disciplines such as Islamiat,2 Urdu, and Social
Studies, and were produced by the Punjab Textbook Board. The Islamiat texts for primary
classes were deemed particularly unacceptable. Many in the Shia community felt that in
these  new books—written  by  a  panel  of  four  Sunni  scholars—not  only  was  the  Shia
interpretation of Islam blatantly disregarded, but the Sunni interpretation was also more
starkly asserted. For example, it was argued that visual representations of performing
prayers followed the Sunni style of prayer, implicitly delegitimizing the Shia way of being
Muslim. Similarly, it was felt that the lives of Caliphs as well as the Prophet’s Companions
were  extensively  discussed,  while  those  of  the  revered  Shia  Imams  were  barely
mentioned. Such representations were deemed to undermine the faith and identity of
Shia youth. Four years after the agitation began, the ‘textbook controversy’—as it came to
be called—turned into a  fatal  conflict  involving violent  confrontations  between state
authorities  and  Shia  protestors,  a  climate  of  heightened  Shia-Sunni  discord,  and  a
constant curfew that paralyzed daily life in the region for eleven months. The matter was
partly resolved in April 2005, when an agreement was reached to withdraw some of the
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controversial  textbooks,  and replace them with those produced by the National Book
Foundation and the NWFP Textbook Board.3
2 Why and how did the issue of textbooks become so huge and consequential? It generated
the collective mobilization and protest of the Shia community against the state for five
years, and at the same time, intensified Shia-Sunni sectarian hostility in Gilgit. As such, it
encompassed much more than what the term controversy might suggest. In this paper, I
attempt to contextualize the Shia outrage against government textbooks in the Northern
Areas, and explore the larger stakes that were implicated in their struggle. 
3 The central argument that I seek to make in this paper is that the politics of sectarianism
in the Northern Areas must be understood in relation to the regulatory processes of state-
making. In the analyses of sectarianism in Pakistan, the state is understood largely as an
instrumentalist policy-maker, and its role limited to considerations of law, the control
and proliferation of madrasas, and party politics (Malik 1996, Zaman 1998, Nasr 2002). My
study, on the other hand, draws upon theories of state-formation that posit the state as
an  assemblage  of  contested  discourses  and  micro-practices  of  discipline  and  power
(Mitchell  1991,  Steinmetz  1999,  Trouillot  2001).  Such  discursive  practices  embody
‘politically organized subjection’ (Abrams 1988) and ‘moral regulation’ (Corrigan & Sayer
1985) through which the social identities of citizen-subjects are cultivated and state rule
accomplished.
4 Textbook representation constitutes a key micro-practice of regulation, as it is a principal
site where the imagined identity of the nation-state as well as its citizens is articulated.
Indeed, textbooks not only serve to naturalize particular understandings of the ‘nation’,
but also reinforce existing social inequalities such as those of class, rural/urban location,
gender, ethnicity, and religion (Apple & Christian-Smith 1991, Pigg 1992, Starrett 1998,
Saigol  2000).  My focus,  in this paper,  is  on the normalization of  religious identity in
Pakistani school textbooks. In official curricula in Pakistan, the idealized and authorized
Pakistani citizen is assumed to be the Sunni Muslim, while other ways of being Muslim
are  silenced.  The  Shia  movement  against  textbooks  challenged  this  silence,  raising
fundamental issues pertaining to religion, nation, and citizenship in Pakistan: what a
Pakistani  is,  or  should  be,  what  a  true  Muslim is,  or  should  be,  and  how  religious
communities  struggle  to  redefine  the  very  terms  of  national  citizenship.  But  the
movement is not just about textbooks. It reached such explosive proportions because
biased textbook content was viewed as part of a long-standing sectarian-political project
of  state-making  in  the  Northern  Areas—one  that  has  repeatedly  spurred  sectarian
resentments not only for thwarting religious difference but also for disrupting regional
political solidarity.
5 Apart from investigating the politics of sectarianized state textbooks, my paper further
problematizes  the  role  of  the  state  in  relation to  sectarian identity  by interrogating
practices through which the state represents ‘minorities’, labels political tensions, and
implements  conflict-management.  These  provide  additional  means  through  which
meaningful citizenship is denied to otherized religious groups. Ironically, even when the
latter try to confront exclusionary state policies—as the Shia communities in Gilgit have
attempted—the  end-result  can  often  be  an  undermining  of  their  rights,  and  a
reproduction of state power. 
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Context
6 The  silencing  of  Shia  beliefs  in  textbook  depictions  of  Islam is  common throughout
Pakistan, in the curricula of public as well as private schools. If such representations are a
routine matter all over Pakistan, why is it that they become particularly problematic and
contested only in the Northern Areas? The answer lies in its demographic constitution:
around 75% of the region’s population follows some form of Shia Islam (Rieck 1997),
almost an exact reversal of the norm in the rest of Pakistan.4 This makes the Northern
Areas the only Shia-majority political unit in Sunni-dominated Pakistan. For a state that
officially proclaims Islam as its raison d’être—Islam that is implicitly coded as Sunni – the
Shia-majority Northern Areas thus constitute a significant source of anxiety. 
7 This religious anxiety is intensified by a geo-political apprehension: the region of the
Northern  Areas  is  a  disputed  border  territory,  comprising  around  86%  of  Pakistan-
administered Kashmir.5 As such, it is central to Pakistan’s national security and territorial
sovereignty. It is ironic that at the heart of Kashmir—which Pakistan claims on the basis
of its ‘Muslim’ identity—lies the region of the Northern Areas which contradicts this very
identity by being home to a different kind of Muslim than that endorsed by Pakistani
nationalism (Ali  2005).  The fear  of  this  different  Muslim,  and of  losing the strategic
territory that s/he inhabits to India, to a broader Kashmiri struggle, or to local nationalist
movements,  has  driven  the  Pakistan  state  to  establish  authoritarian  control  in  the
Northern Areas. It was as part of this project of control that the independent princely
kingdoms  of  the  region  were  abolished  during  1972-1974,  and  replaced  by  a  single
administrative territory cryptically  called the ‘Northern Areas’.6 This  new entity  was
neither given an autonomous status like that of Azad Kashmir, nor a provincial one which
has been granted to other regions of Pakistan. Instead, it was placed under the direct rule
of the non-local, unelected Federal Minister of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas. The
constitutional status of the region continues to remain ambiguous, and its people remain
deprived of even the most fundamental constitutional rights such as the right to vote, to
have representation in Parliament, and to appeal in a higher court.7 In the words of one
resident of the Northern Areas, the exceptional political marginality of the region makes
it a ‘Kashmir within Kashmir’.8
 
Events
8 By 2004, it had been four years since the Shia community in the Northern Areas started
agitating against the controversial curriculum. Delegations had repeatedly appealed to
the Ministry of Education as well as the Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Areas Affairs
in Islamabad, only to be dismissed each time (Stöber 2007). Discouraged and angered, Shia
students began to boycott classes and stage rallies, and more than 300 of them went on a
three-day hunger strike in Gilgit on 17th May 2004.9 Within days, the situation gravely
deteriorated as thousands took to the streets, blocking roads and bringing businesses to a
halt.10 When the prominent Shia leader, Agha Ziauddin Rizvi, declared 3rd June as a day of
protest if the government failed to resolve the syllabus issue by then, the army was called
in  and  a  curfew  imposed  in  Gilgit  town.  However,  street  processions  continued  in
defiance of the curfew, leading to violent clashes between the protestors and security
personnel in several parts of the Northern Areas.
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9 In  the  following  months,  the  situation kept  worsening  as  the  curfew continued and
caused  severe  food  shortages  and  transport  problems,  schools  remained  closed,  and
government  services  and businesses  virtually  shut  down.  An atmosphere  of  extreme
sectarian discord and violence engulfed the region, as the conflict between the Pakistan
state and local Shia communities over the controversial syllabus spiraled into a sectarian
one that pitted local Shia and Sunni communities against each other. For many belonging
to the Shia and Ismaili communities, even quotidian activities like traveling in the bus
became fraught with danger as busses started to get attacked and passengers—deemed to
be non-Sunni based on information about name and home address on national I.D. cards
—were singled out and killed. The conflict intensified even more when on 8th January
2005, Agha Ziauddin Rizvi—the imam of the central Shia mosque in Gilgit and the most
vocal opponent of the controversial syllabus—was gunned down. Even as it was widely
believed that the killing was an act of government intelligence agencies to discipline the
Shia community, it nevertheless generated another wave of Shia-Sunni sectarian strife in
the Northern Areas. More than a 100 people lost their lives in the long-drawn conflict
resulting from the ‘textbook controversy’ (S. Abbas 2005). Things returned to a relative
calm only in April 2005, after leaders from both sects came to a peace agreement through
a jirga, and the government agreed to withdraw two key textbooks that had spawned the
‘controversy’.
10 Deep  sectarian  fissures,  however,  have  taken  root  in  the  region  as  a  result  of  the
‘textbook controversy’, heightening divides that previous state policies had already been
generating (Ahmed 2005). For example, a foreboding trend towards sect-specific, ‘secular’
schools has emerged, reducing opportunities for socialization and friendship between the
youth of different sects. Relations have been tense even among students from different
Muslim communities who study in the same educational institution. As in other conflict
situations, women in the Northern Areas have become particularly vulnerable because
their bodies are constructed as embodiments of community honor, and become sites for
enacting and reproducing community  identity.  Thus,  for  instance,  when schools  and
colleges re-opened in 2005 after remaining closed for a whole year, Shia girls in some
colleges started taking a black chaadar (long scarf). This was a marker of Shia identity11,
but was also practiced so that in the event of a conflict, Shia women could be singled out
for protection by being distinguishable from others wearing the white college uniform. A
teacher from the F.G. College for Women, Gilgit, who pointed this out to me, noted the
absurdity of a protective measure that would render women more visible for attack, and
the sadness  of  a  logic  that  construes  some women as  more worthy of  protection in
situations of conflict. She also commented on how disconcerting it was for her to see an
educational space being visually and physically divided into black and white, and how
this stark dichotomy symbolized the general deterioration of inter-sect relations in the
region.
 
Questioning the texts
11 The textbook movement was spearheaded by the late Agha Ziauddin Rizvi, who was the
imam of the central Shia mosque in Gilgit, and the principal leader of the Shia community
in the Northern Areas. Agha Ziauddin seemed to be a popular leader for the Shias, many
of whom stood by him in his call for a change in the textbooks irrespective of whether
they understood or cared about the curriculum issue. Even those who disagreed with his
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stance on the textbooks nevertheless respected him for the sense of integrity with which
he dealt with the government. He was often described to me as one who ‘could not be
bought’ and who ‘did not fawn on the Chief Secretary’.
12 Agha Ziauddin and other  proponents  of  the  textbook movements  firstly  argued that
Sunni beliefs and values were deeply embedded across the various disciplines that are
taught  in  government  schools.  They  called  for  the  implementation  of  a  consensus
curriculum,  which would be  representative  of  and acceptable  to  all  sects,  and teach
respect for all faiths. Further, they demanded that in the absence of such a curriculum,
the Islamiat curriculum should be optional for Shia students in the Northern Areas.
13 The specific objections to the curriculum were detailed in a document published by the
Islah-e-Nisab (Correction of Curriculum) Committee, Northern Areas, under the aegis of
the Markazi Imamia Jam-e-Masjid (Central Shia Mosque), Gilgit. In this document, the
textbooks used for teaching Urdu, Islamiat, and Social Studies in classes 1 all the way
through B.A. have been meticulously analyzed, and their silencing or negation of Shia
beliefs and practice identified (Islah-e-Nisab Committee Shumali Ilaqajaat 2003). Most of
the objections relate to differences in the interpretation of Islamic history, and in the
performance of Islamic ritual. As a case in point, consider an objection to a page from
Meri Kitab (My Book), a text used by class 1 students in the Northern Areas:
Figure 1. Page from Meri Kitab (My Book), Class 1, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore
14 According to the Islah-e-Nisab Committee, the above content is problematic because its
visual depiction of the performance of namaz (prayer) privileges the Sunni interpretation
of Islam. In Shia practice, hands are typically held loosely on the side during namaz, not
clasped in front as shown in the image. This example was also considered problematic by
several Shia respondents whom I interacted with during my fieldwork, who argued that
such images routinely confuse young Shia children who are learning a different practice
at home, and thus have the potential to make them gumrah (astray).
Outrageous State, Sectarianized Citizens:Deconstructing the ‘Textbook Controv...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 2 | 2008
5
15 Another representation, considered one-sided by the Islah-e-Nisab Committee, is a page
from the official 7th grade textbook for ‘Art and Drawing’ which is reproduced below:
Figure 2. Page from Art and Drawing, Class 7, Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore
16 The above page contains an exercise that directs students to imitate—in sketch and color
—a calligraphic text illustrating the names of the four Caliphs: Abu Bakr, Umar, Usman,
and Ali.  This is in line with Sunni belief which regards Ali  as the fourth caliph; Shia
doctrine,  on  the  other  hand,  disputes  the  authenticity  of  the  caliphate  system,  and
reveres the imamat system in which Ali is the first Imam instead of the fourth Caliph. In
the textbook, this exercise appears right after two other exercises that instruct students
to calligraphically reproduce the word ‘Allah’ and ‘Mohammad’ respectively. The exercise
is particularly significant in the context of the ‘textbook controversy’, as in September
2001, a 7th grade Shia kid was reportedly kicked out from a school in Gilgit for tearing this
exercise  from his  book (Islah-e-Nisab Committee  2003).  This  was  the  first  of  several
incidents that prompted Shia students to boycott their classes, and mobilized the Shia
community in general against the curriculum. 
17 The exercise is both striking and disturbing, as firstly, it demonstrates how an already
pervasive  presence  of  religious  content  in  supposedly  secular  textbooks  in  Pakistan
extends  even  to  the  realm  of  drawing.  Second,  the  exercise  is  accompanied  by  an
intriguing instruction that can be translated in English as:  ‘If  you wish,  you can also
sketch the names of other revered personalities apart from the ones depicted here’. This
might be read as a subtle form of recognizing and permitting sectarian difference, but it
is a limited one: the page neither has an example for calligraphically reproducing the
names of other Muslim personalities, nor space for a sketch that students might wish to
create on their own. Importantly, the wording of the Urdu instruction is such that the
option to illustrate different names can be availed only after the normalized names have
been copied in accordance with Sunni tradition.
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18 The above exercise was also specifically pointed out to me during an interview that I
conducted with a Shia religious figure in Gilgit, Haider Shah. Shah was deeply involved in
the textbook movement, and continues to play a prominent role in the activities of the
central Shia mosque in Gilgit. He argued:
First of all,  what is  the point of putting religion in an art book? Don’t  we have
enough of it already in the Urdu, English, Islamiat, Social Studies (…) basically all
other  books?  Yes,  calligraphy  has  an  important  place  in  Islamic  history,  so  if
desired, one could have an exercise about painting ‘Allah’ or ‘Bismillah ir-Rahman
ir-Rahim’ (In the name of Allah, the Most Beneficent, the Merciful). But why should
our kids have to paint something that contradicts their religious beliefs? I am not
saying  that  we  should  have  a separate  exercise  for  Shia  children,  which
calligraphically  shows the Twelve Imams.  We should not  have any content  that
represents the beliefs of a particular sect. The voice that we raised was not against
one  picture;  it  was  against  the  one-sided  representation  of  Islam  in  the  entire
curriculum, from class 1 till Bachelors. The curriculum has become so poisonous,
fussing over rituals and losing sight of ethics. You see the main problem is that
maulvis are writing the curriculum instead of scholars. The maulvis get their say
because they have managed to portray and dismiss scholars as Westernized and
secular. But why should the government buy into their agenda? This surely has to
change.
19 Haider Shah’s comments came as an unsettling surprise to me, as I had grown to perceive
the textbook movement predominantly in terms of  the assertion of  a Shia ‘religious’
identity,  instead  of  the  ‘secular’  demand—and a  broader  progressive  vision— that  it
evidently  embodied.  I  realized  that  my own unconscious  prejudice—stemming partly
from the violence of a liberal-secular epistemic lens that we tend to internalize under
modernity—had led me to believe that a struggle about religious representation which
was actively promoted by the clergy would be devoid of secular ground and legitimacy. I
was all  the more struck that  this  secular perspective was communicated to me by a
devout  Shia  closely  involved  in  running  the  affairs  of  the  mosque,  and  that  the
perspective emerged from within his understanding of religion. Ultimately, the entire
encounter made me realize the profound unhelpfulness of  ‘religious’  and ‘secular’  as
categories of analysis and as descriptors of social reality.
20 It is more useful, then, to pay close attention to the terms used by the participants of the
textbook movement themselves. In my interviews as well as in documentary sources, the
demand  for  a  consensus  curriculum  was  articulated  as  an  insaani (human),  aaini 
(constitutional), and Islamic right that is due to Shias as citizens of Pakistan (Islah-e-
Nisab Committee 2003, Markazi Shia Tulba Action Committee 2004).  The demand was
further underpinned by a nationalist impulse, proposing that a consensus curriculum was
necessary for achieving Muslim (Shia-Sunni) unity in order to ensure peace, justice, and
development  in  Pakistan.  Simultaneously,  it  was  emphasized  that  people  who  have
helped to create Pakistan and have continued to defend it have come from all sects, and
hence they all deserve recognition in the official school curricula.
21 The Sunni community of Gilgit, on the other hand, by and large opposed the textbook
movement. A teacher, Faraz Malik, objected to the tactics of the movement:
Shia kids were often pressurized into boycotting their  classes.  I  think that Shia
elders are poisoning the minds of young kids with their propaganda.
22 Hajra Jabeen, a college student, was concerned about the consequences of the movement
for the region:
Outrageous State, Sectarianized Citizens:Deconstructing the ‘Textbook Controv...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 2 | 2008
7
Look where we are now. There were open killings in Gilgit because of the textbook
issue. Rangers have set up their chowki (checkpoint) at every corner, and even if
the situation is more normal now, we feel scared if Rangers were to leave.
23 Yet another respondent, Gul Azam, questioned the very rationale of the movement:
How can we change the curriculum and remove references to Hazrat Umar? Why do
Shias hate Umar? The whole Pakistan follows this curriculum. We are Pakistani and
we should not try to be different.
24 This comment indirectly renders the movement as anti-national, reflecting a perception
that was common amongst the Sunni inhabitants of Gilgit. It is presumed that there is
neither any reason nor room for religious difference within a Pakistani nation that is
implicitly conceived as homogenous. The mention of hating Umar also shows that the
movement was perceived as anti-Sunni.
25 The Shia participants took pains to dismiss the allegation that the movement was anti-
Sunni  and  anti-Pakistan.  They  argued  that  their  efforts  were  directed  towards  the
freedom of religious belief which has been promised to every citizen in the constitution.
However,  they  felt  that  the  movement  was  given  an  anti-Sunni  color  by  the  local
administration and intelligence agencies, to mislead the Sunni community and create a
sectarian rift between Sunnis and Shias in the Northern Areas.
 
State-formation and the production of sectarian
difference
26 Representations of Islam such as those discussed above are fundamental to the project of
Pakistani state-formation,  as they provide a chief mechanism through which Islam is
constructed as the ideological basis of the nation, and the legitimating source for the
state. Through these representations, the Pakistani state is naturalized as a space that is
inhabited—barring  a  few  small  groups  of  non-Islamic  minorities—by  a  homogenous
national  community organically united by the force of  Islam.  Textbook Islam is  thus
routinely constituted as a singular belief system, with no sectarian differences. While it is
often claimed that this Islam emphasizes the commonalities of the various schools of
thought  in Islam,  in actuality,  it  is  mostly  the tenets  of  Sunni  Islam—adhered to  by
around 75% of the Muslim population in Pakistan12—which has come to be legitimized as
‘correct’ Islam in textbook representations as well as in classroom teaching. Indeed, a
particular kind of Sunni Muslim is created and privileged in textbook Islam in Pakistan.
While there are many ways of being Sunni and generally of being Muslim, the textbooks
emphasize a narrow and bigoted interpretation that reduces Islam to excessive ritualism,
and  openly  demonizes  other  religions  (Saigol  1994,  Jalal  1995)…13 As  such,  these
representations can be seen as constituting forms of ‘politically organized subjection’
(Abrams 1988) and ‘moral regulation’ (Corrigan & Sayer 1985) through which the social
identities of subjects are homogenized for the making of state and citizen in Pakistan.
27 Processes through which states strive to create such national homogeneity constrain the
possibilities  of  self-ascription,  fluidity and change,  and simultaneously end up giving
‘socio-political significance to the fact of difference’ (Verdery 1994: 46). This means that
difference is raised from ‘the realm of doxa, the assumed, into the realm of notice, where
disputes can occur between the orthodox and the heterodox, the normal and the strange
– that is,  between the values associated with what are now recognized as significantly
different options…but were not previously seen to be so’  (Verdery 1994: 46).  Verdery
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makes  this  argument  for  understanding  how  ethnic  identity  and  difference  become
noticeable,  meaningful  and consequential  because of  the disciplinary practices of  the
modern state,  and I would argue that a similar dynamic is at work in the context of
religious identity and difference in the Northern Areas in Pakistan. At the same time,
though, how and when differences come to matter and produce conflict depends on the
particular historical context in and through which state forms develop.
28 Sectarian  ‘difference’  in  the  Northern  Areas  did  not  always  have  the  meaning  and
consequence that it carries today. In the Gilgit district of the Northern Areas, the time
before the 1970s is remembered as a time of shared life-worlds, when religious identities
were fluid and pluralistic. Though inter-sect skirmishes are acknowledged, people by and
large respected and even participated in each other’s religious rituals, and inter-marriage
across sects was fairly common, with the result that several families in the Northern
Areas today have members who belong to different sects. Such practices defy essentialist
understandings  of  ‘sectarian  difference’  which  presume  that  sectarian  identity  is
inherently exclusionary and antagonistic, and that differences between sects naturally
lead to conflict. Surely, theology itself fosters a sense of incommensurable values (Shaikh
1989) which can and has created conflicts between people with different religious beliefs.
However, we need to examine the conditions and processes—local, national and global—
through which a sense of difference is produced, and the potential for conflict heightened
and  realized.14 I  will  briefly  outline  some  of  these  processes  that  have  enabled  the
production of sectarian difference in the specific context of the Northern Areas.
29 While I cannot undertake a detailed examination here, I would like to highlight that both
the national project of Islamization implemented by General Zia (Weiss 1986) as well as
the international  mobilization of  political  Islam for the Cold War (Mamdani  2004,  H.
Abbas 2005) bears significant responsibility for the rise of sectarian conflict in Pakistan
(Abou Zahab 2002), and hence, also in the Northern Areas. However, state policy specific
to the region must also be investigated to understand the local context of sectarianism.
30 A strong sense of  religious difference has emerged and become politically significant
precisely since the formal  integration of  the Northern Areas into the Pakistan state,
between 1972 and 1974.  This  integration was  effected partly  in  response to  growing
secular-nationalist  voices  in  Gilgit,  which  challenged  the  authoritarian rule  of  the
military-bureaucratic  establishment  in  the  Northern  Areas,  and  demanded  equal
citizenship. By abolishing the system of princely kingdoms, the Pakistan state was able to
pacify the local populace, but meeting their demands for political representation and
fundamental rights was deemed unthinkable in the larger context of the Kashmir dispute
(Ali 2005). Thereafter, state institutions—chiefly the army, intelligence agencies, and the
KANA15 bureaucracy—embarked  upon  a  divide-and-conquer  project 16 that  aimed  at
creating disunity along sectarian lines, in order to thwart regional solidarity and secular-
nationalist aspirations. 
31 This  divide-and-conquer  policy  firstly  entailed  state  sponsorship  of  Sunni  and  Shia
religious organizations, which were required to spur sectarian animosity as a means to
deflect political energy and agreement (Shehzad 2003, personal interviews). Maulvis from
both sects were paid by intelligence agencies to engage in dehumanizing tirades against
sectarian others, through wall-chalking, mosque loudspeakers, and publications. While
each sect was played against the other—primarily the Sunni against the Shia and vice
versa—the  Sunni  sect  was  more  patronized  as  the  Shia  identity  has  been  rendered
antithetical in a gradually Sunni-ized Pakistan state (Qureshi 1989). 
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32 This was accompanied by a targeted suppression of the Shia community in the Northern
Areas. One of the first acts that represented this suppression was the banning of the
traditional Muharram procession in 1974 in Gilgit,  which generated a major sectarian
clash in this Shia-majority region. In popular memory and discourse, this is the period
that is routinely identified with the beginning of ‘sectarian conflict’ (Sökefeld 2003). The
year 1988, moreover, is pointed out as a turning-point in a systematic anti-Shia campaign,
when well-equipped Sunni  lashkaris (militants)—mostly  from the North-West  Frontier
Province—were brought into the Northern Areas with the support of the Zia government
to orchestrate ‘sectarian’ riots (Rieck 1995, Aase 1999). At least 12 Shia-dominated villages
were brutally attacked—bodies were burnt,  imambargas (Shia mosques) torched,  crops
destroyed, and even animals were slaughtered. Shia-dominant villages such as Jalalabad,
Bonji, and Jaglot were completely ruined, while Shia civilians in several other areas fled
from their villages to seek protection. The official death toll was put at 200, but unofficial
accounts estimate the number of deaths at 700 (Shehzad 2003, Ahmed 2005, Abbas 2006).
No official inquiry about this violence has yet been undertaken, and many Shia leaders
still  demand  accountability  and  compensation  for  the  losses  that  the  community
sustained in 1988.
33 Such  grievances  are  compounded  by  other  frustrations  over  economic  and  political
discrimination. The higher posts within the local bureaucracy in Gilgit, for example, have
tended to be dominated by non-local down-country officials belonging to the Sunni sect.
When a Shia District Commissioner was appointed for the first time in 1994, local Sunnis
created  a  huge  furor.  This,  in  the  words  of  an  interviewee,  rankled  even  the  non-
practicing Shia because it demonstrated how bureaucratic positions of power had become
an assumed Sunni privilege.
34 As indicated earlier, practices of religious regulation also constitute key strategies for
regional  subordination,  as  they  help  to  keep  the  strategic  border  territory  of  the
Northern  Areas  divided  along  sectarian  lines—a  division  that  serves  to  disrupt  the
formation of regional unity and avert challenges to the coercive regime that has been put
in place in the region since 1947. Political subjection and religious subjection are thus
intimately linked in the Northern Areas, together helping to maintain territorial control
over the region.
35 This link is commonly understood as well as articulated by people in Gilgit. Irrespective of
their sectarian affiliation, many locals perceive modes of inscribing Shia marginality—
particularly since the 1988 riots—as part of a ‘divide and conquer’ state project, in which
religion has become both a rationale for regional subordination as well  as a tool  for
accomplishing it—the rationale being the threat of a Shia-majority province, and the tool
being the perpetuation of religious sectarianism through various mechanisms.
36 Such historically shaped perceptions about the state affect the meanings that people give
to any new state policy, as well as the consequences that these policies produce. This was
amply demonstrated in  the  context  of  the  ‘textbook controversy’.  While  it  has  been
suggested  and  can  be  reasonably  believed  that  at  least  part  of  the  stronger  Sunni
orientation of the textbooks comes from the domination of the Punjab Textbook Board by
members of the Jamaat-e-Islami, or others who profess a Sunni sensibility (Shehzad 2003),
many Shia protestors as well as local journalists felt that ‘divide and conquer’ was the key
project behind the change in curriculum. How far that is true, I do not know. But it is
important to note that because of historical experiences, people perceive it as such. The
fact that the textbook issue did in fact end up intensifying sectarian conflict in the region
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made people believe all  the more in an assumed intention of  the state to politically
suppress  the  region  by  religiously  dividing  it.  Furthermore,  the  logic  of  ‘divide  and
conquer’  as an explanation for sectarian conflict  in the Northern Areas is  significant
because—like the memories of inter-sect harmony and acceptance—it serves to challenge
arguments that explain ‘sectarianism’ as a natural outcome of religious differences.
37 The link between sectarian differences and regional politics was centered in the demands
of the Shia protestors as well. When the issues of the controversial textbooks emerged,
many local Shias argued that there would not have been any problem with textbooks, if,
like other regions of Pakistan, the Northern Areas too had a separate textbook board to
author its own curriculum.17 If such a body existed, the local populace could have ensured
that  textbook representations  of  Islam were not  biased,  but  rather,  reflective  of  the
different Muslim practices that are prevalent in the region. This perspective meant that
the  Shia  protests  against  the  controversial  textbooks  had  the  potential  of  being
transformed into  a  cross-community  political  demand for  the  creation of  a  separate
textbook board,  hence becoming a  vehicle  for  the  assertion of  regional  identity  and
sovereignty. Such a platform for local unity and citizenship would pose a major threat to
the Pakistan state, and the fear of this possibility was perhaps one of the key reasons that
led the government to crack down severely on the movement against textbooks. Even
before the government crackdown, however,  such a platform could not materialize –
partly  because  the  Shia  demand  for  a  separate  religious  curriculum  was  simply
unacceptable to the Sunni community, but also because many locals felt that a separate
curriculum for Northern Areas Shias would create more divisions in an already polarized
environment. Indeed, the demand for a separate curriculum was opposed within the Shia
community itself, as I elaborate in the next section.
 
Debates and dilemmas of cultural reproduction
38 Like  any  other  community,  the  ‘Shia  community’  in  the  Northern  Areas  is  not  a
homogenous  group  in  which  all  the  Shias  were  uniformly  offended  by  the  new
curriculum, and unanimously opposed it. While grievances against Shia representation in
textbooks were widely shared, many within the local Shia community—particularly older
members and veteran leaders—felt that collective action calling for a replacement of the
curriculum was unwise and unnecessary. At least three discernible reasons for this stance
emerged during personal interviews with some of these Gilgit-based leaders.
39 First, it was felt that the negative impact of discriminatory textbook representations on
Shias dwarfs in comparison to the widespread violence against the Shia community that
has escalated all over Pakistan in recent years. As one leader, Jamal Zaidi put it:
In Karachi, our doctors, engineers, and military officers are being targeted, while
ordinary people continue to die in attacks on our mosques. As a minority that is
facing such a systematic campaign, we need to pick our issues wisely.
40 According to an interviewee, several Shia leaders elsewhere in Pakistan also shared this
perspective, and hence disagreed with Agha Zia on his decision to contest the textbooks.
41 Second, the extent of danger posed by Sunni-biased representations in textbook Islam is
itself considered debatable. As a prominent leader Abbas Hussain commented:
We have always been learning Sunni thought in secular schools, but we have never
lost our faith. Our faith is taught to us at home, and no one can take it away. So why
should we be scared of textbooks ?18
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42 Third, as Abbas Hussain further pointed out, there was a successful struggle for gaining
Shia representation in textbooks elsewhere in Pakistan but far from benefiting Shia
youth, it proved to be immensely detrimental:
In  President  Ayub  Khan’s  time  (1960s),  our  people  raised  their  voice.  A  Shia
Mutalibat  Committee  (SMC)  was  formed  and  because  of  its  efforts,  a  separate
curriculum for Shias was eventually introduced in Prime Minister Zulfiqar Bhutto’s
time in the 1970s. But the person who was grading the Shia section of the Islamiat
syllabus remained Sunni, so Shias were easily singled out for discrimination. In the
exam that one has to take to join the Civil Service, Shia youth particularly suffered
as the rate of failure increased. And so, access to government jobs decreased. It was
at this point that Punjabi Shia youth told the Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakistan19:  we are
suffering  because  of  your  policies.  So  finally,  Shias  themselves  got  rid  of  the
separate curriculum that they had worked so hard to introduce.
43 This  historical  experience  highlights  the  paradoxical  dilemma  in  which  religious
minorities often find themselves when they get political and cultural recognition at the
state level—affirmation of their identity and difference is accompanied with a heightened
visibility that renders them more vulnerable to forms of discrimination. Particularly in
the context of an oppressive and puritanical state, religious minorities therefore feel that
it is much safer to keep a ‘low profile’—a policy that often translates into internalized
modes of suppressing religious identity and practice in the public sphere. The discourse
of  ‘keeping  a  low  profile’  is  particularly  prevalent  amongst  the  Ismaili-Muslim
community in the Northern Areas, which time and again has found itself caught between
the Shia-Sunni conflict.  However, for the Shia community in the Northern Areas, the
situation  is  different.  They  might be  a  minority  from  the  perspective  of  a  Sunni-
majoritarian Pakistani state but numerically, they comprise a sizeable majority of the
population in the Northern Areas. In such a context, the desire, legitimacy, and possibility
of the recognition of Shia religious identity take on a different salience.
 
Citizenship versus sectarianism: Competing
representations of struggle
44 The demand for equal representation in textbook discussions of Islam can be seen as a
religious  right,  which  Shias  in  Gilgit  claim for  the  simple  reason  that  they  too  are
Muslims, and that their children deserve to learn about their own faith whenever Islam is
taught in public schools. However, as mentioned earlier, the movement participants and
supporters simultaneously employed the liberal discourse of citizenship to describe their
struggle.  They  claimed  that  as  citizens  of  the  Pakistani  state,  it  was  their  secular,
constitutional right to have ‘freedom of religion’, and necessary protections as a national
minority.20
45 Recourse to this vocabulary is critical and effective for two reasons. First, it constitutes a
creative strategy of making a claim to citizenship rights, in a context where these have
been consistently denied even in their most basic forms. In fact, it can be argued that it
was precisely the historical marginalization of the region and the repression of secular-
nationalist struggles within it, which paved the way for religion to emerge as an idiom of
claiming citizenship and sovereignty for the dominant Shias in the region. After all, it is
not  uncommon  for  assertions  of  cultural  identity—and  difference—to  take  place  in
contexts of political and economic marginality.
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46 Second,  the  liberal  discourse  of  rights  offered  a  way  to  counter  the  official
representations of the struggle against the controversial textbooks, in which the demand
for the withdrawal of  the textbooks was portrayed as part  of  a subversive ‘sectarian
agenda’ by the Shia populace. Instead, the protesting Shias constantly asserted that the
issue was not primarily a Sunni-Shia one, but one that was fundamentally tied to the
state-citizen relation.21 The discourse of constitutionally guaranteed citizenship allowed
the Shias to overcome their representation as the ‘others’ of secular politics, and claim
that their agenda was fully in line with the criteria of a modern liberal democracy – in
fact, it was the Pakistan state itself which was upholding sectarian biases by privileging
Sunni ideology, and promoting authoritarianism by denying legitimate regional rights to
the people of the Northern Areas. Hence, the state was portrayed as the culprit because it
was abusing its duty of looking after the common good of society, which is constructed as
its fundamental purpose in the modern-liberal paradigm.
47 In contrast, the dominant way in which the textbook issue was represented in official and
media discourses was through the motif of ‘sectarianism’.22 Indeed, in the last five years
or  so,  the  sociopolitical  landscape of  the  Northern Areas  in  general  has  come to  be
characterized and explained through the paradigmatic idiom of  Shia-Sunni  ‘sectarian
conflict’. This is not to deny that inter-sect discord in multiple forms has indeed become a
grave everyday reality in the region. What is problematic, however, is the way in which
the depictions of the region as a sectarian mess overshadow the political contestations
that underlie most of the cases that are branded as instances of sectarian conflict.
48 The representation of state-society political conflict as inter-group religious discord is
both a reminder and continuation of colonial strategies of rule. The rhetoric of Hindu-
Muslim communalism was routinely employed by the British colonial state in India to
reduce particular conflicts that challenged its authority to local ‘religious’ differences, so
that it could absolve itself of responsibility, construct resistances as pathological, and
then quell them under the pretext of restoring harmony (Freitag 1990, Mayaram 1997).
The vocabulary of religion provides a particularly useful means for deflecting political
contestation and reinscribing state paternalism, as it helps to recast legitimate political
grievances as primordial, anti-modern demands by emotional, irrational subjects. Such
an ‘emotionalizing’ of political issues is a key strategy of accomplishing state rule.
49 In present-day Northern Areas, the discourse of ‘sectarian conflict’ similarly produces a
depoliticizing effect: backward society is in a state of anarchy, stemming from supposedly
primordial intra-Islam differences, and the innocent and caring state constantly needs to
intervene to create order. If it were not for the state, the region would remain steeped in
violence, and as a state official put it, ‘the uncompromising attitude of ulema of both the
sects’ would ‘destabilize the area’.23 This was precisely the language used in an official
press release by the Northern Areas Home Department to explain the violent clashes and
continuous curfews that paralyzed the region in October 2005. The clashes had started
after  security personnel  shot  at  students who were peacefully protesting against  the
death  of  their  colleague  in  custody,  but  the  incident  was  conveniently  represented
officially  and  in  the  media  as  one  in  which  law enforcement  agencies  were  dealing
appropriately with the ‘sectarian elements’ afflicting the region.24 Similarly, the discourse
of sectarianism can be and has been instrumentalized by intelligence agents for covering
up attacks on anti-government leaders, as these can be conveniently attributed to the
workings of some Shia or Sunni fundamentalist outfit depending on the ascribed identity
of the leader.
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 Minoritizing the subject
50 Apart from creating a depoliticized representation of conflicts in the Northern Areas, the
discourse  of  sectarianism  also  invokes  a  majority/minority  distinction  that  further
misrepresents the political and social realities of the Northern Areas. When one hears of
Shia demands in the Northern Areas and conflict due to these demands, the internalized
image that is conjured is one of a religious minority trying to scramble for rights and
‘creating issues’—it is not usually known that the Shias constitute a sizeable majority in
the region. Even if this is known, there is a certain way in which majoritarian politics
creates  a  complacency  that  undermines  the  concerns  of  national  minorities.  This
complacency is  widely  spread in  society  and not  limited to the views and practices  of
members of religious parties. Hence, the majority/minority distinction itself becomes a
key mode of subjection for religious groups like the Shias in Pakistan. 
51 Let me problematize this distinction more. To begin with, the distinction assumes that
homogeneous cultural  groups exist  which can be neatly  parceled into ‘majority’  and
‘minority’. However, culture is a messy, interactive process (Gilroy 1987, Hall 1992) that is
necessarily  constituted through borrowings across  boundaries  (Said 1993),  and hence
cultural identities—whether minority or majority—cannot be construed as pure, unified
and fixed.  The Northern Areas  in  particular  has  a  long history  of  pluralist  religious
identities,  with inter-marriages and shared participation in religious rituals being the
norm instead of the exception. Secondly, constructions of majority and minority privilege
one particular form of identity in defining and numerically dividing a population, as if the
reality of people’s multiple social positions and complex subjectivities—stemming from
the  interacting  identities  of  class,  gender,  ethnicity,  religion,  and  language  amongst
others —can be simplistically reduced to a single, determining essence. Most importantly,
the  majority/minority  distinction  constitutes  a  critical  discourse  through  which  the
hegemonies of particular collectivities are sustained, and their access to the apparatus of
the  state  naturalized.  Hegemonic  power  asserts  itself  as  the  legitimate  authority  by
appealing to the logic of ‘majority rule’—defined in terms of religious, ethnic, class, and
other identities. Simultaneously, by constructing various others as ‘minority’, it renders
them somehow less legitimate, as assumed deviants because they are not ‘normal’, and
hence, justifiably deprived from a recognition of identity, and participation in structures
of  authority  (Anthias  &  Yuval-Davis  1992).  This  utility  of  the  majority-minority
distinction in maintaining hegemonic power makes it effective for the accomplishment of
state  rule.  Not  surprisingly,  then,  the  minority/majority  distinction has  been deeply
embedded in legitimizing discourses of  nationalism. In nationalist  projects across the
world,  the  ‘imagined  community’  (Anderson  1991)  of  the  nation  was  frequently
constructed  as  one  in  which  an  imagined  majority personified  the  nation,  and  ‘a
‘minority’ tolerated only insofar as it proved able to accommodate the demands of the
fictitious  majority  represented  by  the  state’  (Benbassa  &  Rodrigue  2000:  105).  The
distinctiveness of the minority was ‘to receive expression only in private, and destined
eventually to disappear within the majority’ (Benbassa & Rodrigue 2000: 105).
52 This disappearance within the majority has not only been achieved through the denial of
equal and substantive citizenship to those labeled as ‘minorities’, but also the denial of
their very existence via mechanisms of  legal  subjugation and physical  violence.  Such
processes of minoritization can be totally disruptive of people’s sense of security and
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belonging,  as  has  been  amply  and  shamefully  demonstrated  in  the  case  of  Ahmadi
repression in Pakistan (Kennedy 1989). However, in some situations, the discourse of a
minority status can in fact be appropriated to claim rights and protection. The problem,
of course, is that even when so-called minorities achieve their objectives, just treatment
is not a guarantee. On the contrary, the granting of their demands can make them even
more vulnerable to discrimination, by making them legible to state officials whose ways
of thinking remain structured by the majority/minority discourse. My reference here is
to my earlier discussion of the ways in which Shias in Pakistan successfully struggled for
a separate curriculum, but then themselves organized to abdicate this right as their new
visibility became the very source of their educational and economic subjection.
 
Conclusion
53 Sectarian conflict in Pakistan has risen remarkably in recent years, particularly in the
wake of Zia’s Islamization program, the Iranian revolution, and the Afghan war, all of
which  have  fueled  the  creation  and  sustenance  of  sectarian  hostility  and  violence
(Qureshi  1989,  Zaman  1998,  Nasr  2002,  Abou-Zahab  2004).  These  processes  surely
influenced the emergence of Shia-Sunni conflict in the Northern Areas as well. However,
a closer study of sectarian conflict in the Northern Areas reveals that here, the issue is
fundamentally linked to the religious and geo-political anxieties that this Shia-majority,
contested border territory poses for the Pakistan state, as a result of which the state has
established particularly harsh regimes of political and religious subjection in the region.
Further,  analyses  of  sectarianism in Pakistan have focused heavily  on the politics  of
militant religious parties, but as the case of the Northern Areas demonstrates, we also
need to be attentive to the ways in which sectarianism is both propagated and contested
in the realm of cultural representations as well. Finally, it has often been argued that
sectarianism constitutes a key ‘threat’ to the Pakistan state, due to which the country
remains an ‘unachieved nation’ (Jaffrelot 2002). Such discourses tend to render the state
as a hapless victim with no causal responsibility in the matter,  and moreover,  risk a
reproduction of the standard hegemonic narrative in which the military-dominated state
claims to be striving to protect Pakistani society from extremism and sectarianism. The
regional context of the Northern Areas, however, illuminates a reverse logic, as the state
itself is perceived as a threat to people’s identities and sectarian relations in the region.
We hence need to focus more on the role of the state, on the content of categories such as
the  ‘state’  and  ‘sectarian  identity’,  and  on  the  ways  in  which  these  categories  are
mutually  constituted  in  a  dialectical  relation  with  each  other.  These  categories  are
historically formed and internally contested, and in fact, always in the process of making
and negotiation. Instead of assuming them to be unified, already-made and oppositional,
we need to investigate how the nation-state is itself formed through the cultivation of
particular religious identities, and the ways in which the latter are transformed in the
process.
54 The ‘textbook controversy’ in Gilgit offers a useful lens to interrogate how state practices
in Pakistan have served to normalize particular religious sensibilities for its  citizens.
Instead of homogenizing identity by ‘managing’ difference, these practices have served to
aggravate  inter-sect  differences  and conflict  in  the  Northern Areas.  Hence,  it  is  not
surprising that movements for religious assertion have taken strong root in the region in
recent years. For many in the Shia community of the Northern Areas, the movement for a
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separate  Shia  curriculum provided a  concrete,  verifiable  manifestation of  the  state’s
sectarian-political agenda, around which the local Shias could mobilize and have more
realistic chances of getting their voices heard as compared to mobilization around other
demands.  The  ‘controversy’  over  textbooks  was  an outlet  for,  and consequence  of  a
history of political and religious suppression in the Northern Areas that has been vitally
responsible for the polarization of sectarian relations in the region. The right to have
representation  of  Shia  identity  in  school  textbooks  was  seen  by  Shia  protestors—
particularly by the younger generation—as a mode for securing recognition and cultural
reproduction, even as veteran leaders challenged this connection. Moreover, through the
idiom of religion, the Shia subjects of the Northern Areas were also articulating a political
demand for legitimate, substantive inclusion in a polity that has historically denied them
even the most  basic citizenship rights—partly on the very grounds of  their  different
religious  identity.  Hence,  asserting  religious  difference  and  getting  it  politically
recognized in official arenas such as education becomes a potential, and perhaps the only
viable way to achieve similarity and equal treatment as citizens of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan.
55 Towards this end, Shia protestors and sympathizers of the movement against textbooks
productively  framed their  struggle  in  a  religious  idiom as  well  as  in  liberal-political
terms, challenging the sense of contradiction that is usually ascribed to these forms of
politics.  By  drawing  attention  to  the  controversial  texts  and  also  by  securing  an
agreement with state authorities for withdrawing the texts, the movement participants
helped to subvert the universalizing—and dangerous—project of the state to claim and
establish a narrow vision of Islam as the basis for a supposedly homogenous national
culture. Yet, at the same time, the movement against the textbooks produced a sharp
response from the paramilitary and intelligence apparatus of the state as well as local
Sunni groups, resulting in a violent conflict that severely disrupted people’s lives and
livelihoods. This led many across the spectrum to question whether textbooks justified
such a confrontation with a repressive regime, and thus alienated them from the cause of
the  movement.  Ironically,  then,  the  movement  helped  to  reproduce  state  power  by
intensifying  sectarian  distrust  and  conflict  in  the  region,  and  thus  obstructing
possibilities of local unity for political empowerment.
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NOTES
1. The term ‘Shia’ in this paper refers specifically to the Isna-Ashari (Twelver) Shias.
2. Islamiat is a subject that focuses on the study of Islam. It was declared a compulsory subject for
all Muslim students in Pakistan, under General Zia’s Islamization program.
3. ‘Schools Re-Open Today in Northern Pakistan After One-Year’, Pakistan Times, 27thApril 2005.
http://pakistantimes.net/2005/04/27/national1.htm.  I  say  ‘partly’  because  the  controversial
texts numbered far more than those that were going to be replaced, and further, the replacement
that was agreed in principle has not materialized on the ground in the Northern Areas. 
4. In Gilgit  town, specifically,  the Twelver Shias are perceived to be in majority,  alongside a
sizeable presence of Sunnis as well as Ismailis. 
5. Pakistan controls about 84,159 square kilometers of the former Princely State of Jammu and
Kashmir. Azad Kashmir comprises 11,639 square kilometers of this area, while Northern Areas
occupy 72,520 square kilometers (Weiss 1994).
6. See Sökefeld (2005) for a discussion of how colonial forms of domination in the Northern Areas
have continued in the postcolonial context.
7. In 1994, the one million people of the Northern Areas were finally entitled to elect their own
legislative council but its powers were severely limited. Policies on the ground continue to be
made primarily by the Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas,  as well  as the Force
Command Northern Areas which is the military headquarters in Gilgit.  In 1999, the Supreme
Court of Pakistan gave the government six months to extend fundamental constitutional rights
as  well  as  legislative  and executive  powers  to  the  Northern Areas  but  nothing concrete  has
materialized yet. 
8. Letter to the Editor, The Friday Times, 14th-21st May 2004.
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9. ‘Hunger Strike’, Dawn, 20th May 2004. 
10. ‘Syllabus Protests Paralyse Business and Traffic’, Daily Times, 1st June 2004. 
11. Black is a traditionally significant color for Shias, particularly symbolic of the practice of
mourning the martyrdom of Hussain, the grandson of Prophet Mohammad. 
12. Such figures—whether used to represent Sunnis or Shias—always need to be accompanied
with words of caution: information about sects is not collected in the Pakistani census, and hence
the figure quoted is a commonly used estimate. The figure is an abstraction of course, as the
‘Sunni sect’  or ‘Shia sect’  incorporates diverse and often contradictory religious perspectives.
Also, many people would describe themselves as Sunni or Shia in a broad cultural and social
manner, without adhering to particular religious beliefs and practices.
13. The Islamic content of textbooks in Pakistan has recently become somewhat of a national
controversy,  militantly  defended in  the discourse  of  religious  parties  and deeply  opposed in
widely  publicized  scholarly  research that  has  elaborated  the  ways  in  which curricula  across
Pakistan propagate  religious  intolerance  and violence  (Nayyar  & Salim 2003).  Curiously,  this
scholarly  attention  has  not  focused  adequately  on  how  internal  differences  within  Islam—
particularly between the Shia and Sunni interpretations – are represented in official textbooks,
which is  ironic since it  is  precisely this aspect of  textbooks that has been most prominently
contested in Pakistani history, and recently become the source of violent conflict in the Northern
Areas.
14. Simultaneously, we need to be attentive to the lived realities of overlapping identities, co-
existence, and co-operation through which the potential of conflict is constantly undermined. 
15. KANA  stands  for  the  Ministry  of  Kashmir  Affairs  and  Northern  Areas;  it  is  the  federal
institution that directly administers the Northern Areas.
16. The language of ‘divide and conquer’ is not my own reading of the situation; this English term
was widely used by my research subjects to describe the Pakistan state’s approach towards the
Northern Areas. 
17. It is worth noting that even Azad Kashmir has a separate textbook board. 
18. It is important to note that people in the region have not always been learning Islam—Sunni
or otherwise—in public  schools.  The system of  modern schooling in the Northern Areas was
introduced by the British in 1893. Till 1947, there was no designated subject for religious studies.
People were accustomed to sending their kids to neighborhood preachers, or educated children
in their homes. It was only when Islam became a compulsory subject in postcolonial Pakistan
that the issue of Shia kids learning Sunni Islam emerged. The issue became particularly marked
during  the  Zia  years,  when  Islamic  studies  became  significantly  more  Sunni-ized,  and  its
emphasis shifted from ethics to rituals e.g. on issues such as the correct way to perform wuzzu 
(ablution).
19. Founded in 1979, TJP is the foremost Shia political party in Pakistan. 
20. Interestingly,  these  protections  were  first  put  into  the  Pakistani  constitution  precisely
because of Shia mobilization for rights and representation (Rieck 2000). 
21. Even in the so-called sectarian riots that had engulfed the region in June 2004, the buildings
that were burnt were prominent government buildings, not Shia or Sunni mosques as would be
the case in many other parts of Pakistan. 
22. Whether portrayed merely as a matter of sectarianism or not, it is important to note that the
political situation in the Northern Areas has generally received dismal coverage in the national
press. Moreover, local journalists whose voices do manage to make it to the national press have
been severely harassed by government officials for their reporting of the region.
23. ‘Eight Religious Leaders Held’, Dawn, 16th October 2005. 
24. This is not to deny that the Sunni and Shia clergy has indeed inflamed the sectarian situation
in the Northern Areas on several  occasions.  Rather,  my point is  that  several  recent cases of
‘sectarian conflict’ in the Northern Areas cannot be simplistically reduced to the rhetoric of the
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parochial, conflict-prone sectarian elements. Moreover, it is important to recognize that state
policies themselves have indirectly or directly contributed to the power of  the clergy in the
Northern Areas, and elsewhere in Pakistan. 
ABSTRACTS
This paper examines the ‘textbook controversy’ (2000-2005) that arose when the Pakistan state
introduced new, overtly Sunni textbooks in the Northern Areas, and the local Shia population
began to agitate for a more balanced curriculum. The conflict reached an acute stage during
2004-2005,  as  violent  confrontations  took place  between Shia  and Sunni  communities,  and a
constant  curfew  paralyzed  daily  life  in  Gilgit  for  eleven  months.  I  argue  that  the  Shia
mobilization  against  textbook  Islam  was  not  just  a  form  of  “sectarian”  outrage;  rather,  it
symbolized  a  broader  political  claim  to  inclusion  in  a  context  of  long-standing  regional
subordination  and  religious  suppression.  The  politics  of  sectarian  emotions  in  the  Northern
Areas  must  therefore  be  understood in relation to  the regulatory processes  of  state-making,
which are the very source and embodiment of ‘sectarianism’ and ‘outrage’ in the region. 
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